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AVIATION

LORNA DYER KENT*
Attorney
Bureau of Enforcement
Civil Aeronautics Board

REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM
The Report of the CAB Special Staff on Regulatory Reform was issued
22, 1975. The unanimous recommendations set forth in the report
July
on
represented the position of the Special Staff and did not represent positions of other elements of the Civil Aeronautics Board's (Board) Staff.
The Special Staff generally concluded that protective entry control,
exit control and public utility-type price regulation under the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, are not justifiable in relation to the
underlying cost and demand characteristics of commercial air transportation. The Special Staff stated that the airline industry is essentially
naturally competitive as opposed to monopolistic and therefore believes
that service quality and price will be highly responsive to demand created
by immediate threats of new entry in markets presently served by a
single carrier. In addition, the Special Staff felt that in the long term,
possibilities for new entry will insure that the overall system will be
composed of highly efficient carriers with the ability to adapt to rapidly
changing conditions in the market place. Accordingly, the Special Staff
suggested a statutory amendment to the Federal Aviation Act which would
eliminate protective entry, exit and public utility-type price control in
domestic air transportation within a three to five year period.
However, the staff did not advocate the removal or relaxation of
those features of airline regulation which appear to be required in the
public interest. In fact, the staff called for new requirements to assure
the maintenance of safe operations and the adoption of measures to
*J. D., University of Miami, B. A., Chatham College. Miss Kent is a member of
the Florida Bar. The statements and opinions contained in this report are Miss Kent's
own and do not necessarily represent the opinions and/or conclusions of the Civil
Aeronautics Board or the Bureau of Enforcement.
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prevent or ameliorate market imperfections caused by external factors
relating to airport, fuel allocation and State regulation.
Further recommendations in the deregulation program by the Special
Staff included the following: (1) issuing temporary licenses for airlines
only upon proof of financial fitness and renewal of such licenses upon
continuing proof of financial fitness; (2) strengthening of FAA surveillance; (3) empowering the government to enable it to promulgate
insurance and bonding requirements together with other measures reasonably necessary to assure that carrier economic conditions not impair substantial safety standards; (4) maintaining subsidized small community
service by means of low-bid contracts awarded to operationally and
financially qualified carriers; and (5) retaining and/or expanding Board
authority over antitrust matters, including predatory conduct and mergers. Additionally, the Special Staff recommended that the precise scope
and language of the aforementioned legislative proposals should be referred to and refined by an independent public body, such as the proposed
National Commission on Regulatory Reform.
The Special Staff also recommended the Board support a legislative
program which the Staff suggests be implemented independently of the
general regulatory reform program. 'Such legislative proposals were formulated to comport with the statutory purpose of the existing regulatory
scheme and were integrated with trends toward deregulation to master
the following objectives: (1) increase price/quality options available to
the American traveling and shipping public; (2) encourage greater efficiency through price competition and regulatory action which will
lower costs, and (3) open defined sectors or zones of air transportation
to regulation by market forces by removing entry and price controls in
order to stimulate price competition, innovation and new services.
The condensed legislative proposals, as set forth in the Report o/ the
CAB Special Staff on Regulatory Reform: General Conclusions and
Principal Recommendations, dated July 22, 1975, read as follows:
(1)

Statutory and other changes designed to create or widen less
regulated zones

The Board should press for legislation designed to authorize it to:
-Open entry for supplemental (charter only) carriers (subject
to continuing proof of financial fitness) and gradually liberalize
charter rules under legislation giving the Board authority to
define "charters" as any full-up operation ; 1
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-open
entry for all-cargo carriers (subject to continuing
proof of financial fitness) and eliminate price controls in
respect to domestic cargo air transportation in stages over a
period of two years;
-establish low-bid contract system for the provision of small
community subsidized. air service2 (or any other uneconomic
service that is deemed to be required); and simultaneously
(a) commence a gradual phase-out of certificated local service
carrier small community operations and subsidy, and (b)
allow economically unregulated commuter carriers to use
aircraft of up to 55 revenue seats (instead of the present 30).
(2)

Discretionarypolicy changes

The Board should administer rate, route, charter, and other policies
so as to preserve the financial integrity of existing carriers, and also:
whether to establish ceiling fares under which
-Consider
carriers could reduce prices in response to competitive and
other changing conditions subject to prohibitions against unlawful discrimination, predatory conduct, and causing other
carriers to be placed in financial jeopardy;
-continue
to perfect and expand domestic passenger fare
standards with a view to creating incentives (as opposed to
mandatory requirements) for greater carrier efficiency, and
utilize these to determine the ceiling, if a ceiling approach
is adopted;
-gradually
liberalize charter rules consistently with the
development of normal fare ceilings to widen the price/
quality choice for consumers, and thus encourage price competition for discretionary travel between supplemental and
scheduled carriers;
---expand route authority in accordance with demand and
to permit congested large-hub airports to be by-passed, perfect
the authority of local service carriers in on-line markets, approve new competitive authority to correct deficiencies or to
improve services, and, to the extent feasible, select the most
efficient carrier among competing applicants; and
-- continue to discourage or disapprove mergers between large
or viable carriers.

AVIATION

BAGGAGE AND DELAY LOSS
By Notice of Proposed Rule Making, EDR-282, dated March 6,
1975, and published at 40 F.R. 11602, March 12, 1975, the Civil Aeronautics Board (Board) gave notice that it had under consideration a proposed amendment to Part 221 of its Economic Regulations (14 CFR
Part 221) which would remove the authority to file tariffs imposing time
limits on the filing of passenger claims for loss of, damage to, or delay
in the delivery of baggage. The Board described its actions as a concerted
effort to formulate just and reasonable rules to prevent negligent and
discriminatory baggage handling practices and to insure proper settlement of baggage claims in the event of loss, injury or delay. Citing
existing tariffs3, it was noted that actions arising from baggage loss,
damage or delay were barred unless written notice of the claim was received by the carrier within 45 days of the incident. The Board tentatively concluded that such tariffs were unlawful in that they barred recovery of legitimate claims and did not appear to serve a useful purpose.
Thus, the Board proposed to amend Part 221 of the Economic Regulations by adding the following subparagraph (1) to section 221.38:
§221.38

Rules and Regulations

(1) Baggage liability rules. No provision of the Board's regulations issued under this part or elsewhere shall be construed to permit
on and after
the filing of any tariff rules stating
any limitations on or condition relating to, the time period within
which passengers must present written claims for loss of, damage to, or
delay in delivering of baggage.
In a related action, Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making, EDR283, dated March 6, 1975, and published at 40 F.R. 11601, March 12,
1975, the Board gave notice that it had under consideration the issuance
of a Notice of Proposed Rule Making looking towards the adoption of a
regulation prescribing liquidated damages for delay in the receipt of
baggage and a minimum liability for loss of baggage.
Compensation for Delayed Baggage
The Board noted the compensation for inconvenience suffered by
passengers due to baggage delay was severely limited for two reasons:
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(1) existing tariffs do not afford passengers compensation for consequential damages, and (2) damages resulting from delay in the receipt
of baggage are by their nature intangible and difficult to quantify. Although carriers have made efforts to accommodate passengers whose baggage was delayed through authorizing reimbursement of costs for incidental necessities incurred by virtue of the temporary loss, no carrier
was known to have established a policy of reimbursing passengers for
frustration, inconvenience and other consequential efforts of the delay. In
fact, as noted supra, the carriers' tariffs appear to effectively disclaim
liability for consequential damages.
Accordingly, the Board suggested a regulation prescribing liquidated
damages to compensate passengers for damages common to all those
suffering delays. Such liquidated damages would be in lieu of any right
to recover for consequential damages and passenger eligibility for recovery
would include those passengers whose baggage was not available in the
normal course of unloading the flight. The Board contemplated that any
regulation of this nature should apply to all trips on certified carriers
in interstate or overseas air transportation.
Minimuim Liability for Lost Baggage
Air carriers' lost baggage settlement practices which have generated the
majority of consumer complaints to the Board are: (1) requiring purchase
receipts for lost items; (2) limiting recovery for loss to depreciated value;
and (3) strict adherence to time limitations on filing claims. It is recognized that air carriers must institutionalize some mechanisms to protect
themselves from fraudulent claims but the Board has maintained that the
protection of the air carrier cannot justify recovery procedures in extremis
which serve to deny or arbitrarily reduce legitimate claims for loss.
The Board favors the establishment of regulated minimum liability
for loss of baggage to reduce the abuse of the settlement process. Consequently, the Board recommends that any carrier which loses a passenger's
baggage, or any piece thereof, automatically would be liable for a specified
minimum dollar amount. Such established minimum liability would not
preclude passengers, whose baggage value exceeded the minimum, from
filing a claim for the additional loss up to the carrier's liability. However,
acceptance of the minimum, would preclude the passenger from subsequently claiming additional damages. In addition, the Board tentatively concluded that if a bag had not been located within 60 days of the date of the
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flight on which it was checked, it should be presumed lost for purpose of
invoking the carriers' minimum liability.
Contemporaneously with the Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making, the Board issued Order 75-3-18
(March 6, 1975) requiring the industry to show cause: (1) why the existing standard limitation on baggage liability should not be raised to $750;
(2) why consequential damages should not be included within both the
standard liability limit and the provisions for declaration of excess value;
(3) why the existing provisions of Rule 365---"Liability of Carrier" should
not be found unlawful; (4) why the existing standard limitation of liability
should not be waived where it can be shown that with regard to the particular claimant the baggage liability notice provisions of section 221.176
of Part 221 of the Board's Economic Regulations have not been complied
with; and (5) why the above provisions should not, with equal effect, be
applicable to all air carriers engaging in interstate and overseas air transportation of passengers.
Comments on the Board's proposals have been submitted together
with replies. The Board has yet to take further action but some action is
expected in the near future.
INFORMATION DESCRIBING AVAILABLE FARES
Section 403(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended
[49 U.S.C. 1373(a)] provides, inter alia, that every air carrier and foreign
air carrier shall file with the Civil Aeronautics Board (Board) and keep
open for public inspection, all of its rates, fares and charges for air transportation. In addition, Section 403(a) provides that the tariffs must be
"filed, posted and published in such form and manner, and shall contain
such information, as the Board shall by regulation prescribe. .. ".
In light of the numerous discount fares recently filed by air carriers
and subsequently approved by the Board, the Aviation Consumer Action
Project (ACAP) petitioned the Board on May 23, 1975, to institute a
rule making proceeding to formulate reasonable rules for dissemination
of information on air fares. 4 ACAP believes the Board should require fare
tariffs be posted and published in a form and manner which will be both
understandable and available to ticket purchasers.
In its petition, ACAP cites a report dated April 17, 1975, from the
Washington Post, wherein a TWA executive stated that his company of.
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fered 20 different fares between New York and Los Angeles, ranging from
$115.24 to $234.34. Due to the differences in discount plans, involving
either advance, ticket purchase, minimum trip duration or limitation as to
time and day of travel, ACAP recommends that each carrier should be
required to print and distribute a price list for all its major markets and
a general description of its discount fare plans in all other markets.
'By Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making, EDR-285, dated June
5, 1975, the Board gave notice that it had under consideration a rule making action to amend Part 221 of the Board's Economic Regulations (14
CFR Part 221) to require carriers to publish and disseminate simplified
information to the travelling public regarding the various available fares
and their applicable restrictions. The Board particularly invited comments
addressing the benefits and detriments of rules that would:
(1)

Require each carrier to publish and disseminate simplified
statements describing all fares, and their attendant conditions, for service between each city-pair market which the
carrier serves, or at least in the most heavily traveled
markets; or

(2)

require each carrier to publish and disseminate a summary
description of all its discount fares and their respective conditions, possibly along with a tabular presentation of sample
comparisons with normal fares; or

(3)

require each carrier to compile and disseminate copies of
tariff pages showing the entire list of fares in designated
markets, along with pertinent excerpts of the actual text of
its tariff rules describing available discount fares; or

(4)

require that specific information be included in carrier advertising; or

(5)

combine two or more of the foregoing requirements.

The date for filing comments on the proposed rule making was extended until August 11, 1975.
CAPACITY REDUCTION AGREEMENTS
In 7 Law. Am. 234-237, 1975, this report contained a section which
reviewed a recent initial decision in C.A.B. Docket 22908 by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), wherein the judge concluded that the capacity
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reduction agreement, originally approved in 1971, involving American,
TWA and United Air Lines and covering four transcontinental markets,
was adverse to the public interest. This decision was appealed to the full
Civil Aeronautics Board (Board) for a final determination. The Board
reached its decision on July 21, 1975, and affirmed the ALJ's conclusions
in Order 75-7-98 (July 21, 1975).
In a departure from the initial decision, the Board condoned a less
rigorous standard for weighing the merits and demerits of capacity agreements, in general. The Board adopted the standard for weighing anticompetitive agreements as defined in the Local Cartage Agreement Case,
15 C.A.B. 850 (1952), (hereafter Local Cartage). Local Cartage provided:
When an agreement has among its significant aspects elements
which are plainly repugnant to established antitrust principles,
approval should not be granted unless there is a clear showing
that the agreement is required by a serious transportation need,
or in order to secure important public benefits. Local Cartage
Agreement Case, 15. C.A.B. 850, 853 (1952).
The Board finds that although arguments in favor of capacity agreements might run afoul of the Sherman Act, this does not necessarily
mean that adequate justification for their implementation could not be
found to exist in the air transportation field under the public interest
standard which the Board is compelled to apply. The Board said it was
of the opinion that there may be circumstances in the future where a
short term departure from a normal reliance on competitive forces and
unilateral restraint as a means of rectifying problems of excess capacity
will be justified. However, the Board added, "such agreements should not
become a normal, customary and continuing feature of the air transportation system."
The Board stated that initial approval of the 1971 capacity agreements, Order 71-8-91, was conditioned upon the urgent industry need to
alleviate what was termed as an "extraordinary" excess-capacity problem,
"which could not be remedied by normal competitive forces and unilateral
action on a timely basis, and which threatened serious injury to certain
of the carriers and the air transportation system as a whole."
However, the Board distinguished present market conditions from
those existing during the original adoption period. The CAB pointed to
presently effective Executive and Congressional economic recovery pro-
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grams, increases in passenger traffic, and newly approved fare discount
proposals. In addition, the Board was not persuaded that fuel cost savings
resulting from capacity agreements could sufficiently outweigh the detriments arising from the impairment of a competitive air transportation
system in the present market.
In the area of international aviation, the Board was careful to distinguish its views. The Board stated that its position with regard to domestic markets could "not be applied to international capacity agreements
without taking into account the often decisively different circumstances
'5
which prevail in the international arena."
FLOW-THROUGH SUBSIDY AWARD TO AIR TAXI OPERATOR
On July 11, 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, vacated CAB Order 74-4-77 (April 12, 1974) by
which the Board had awarded "flow-through" subsidy to Air Midwest
through Frontier Airlines, Inc., a local service air carrier. Air Midwest,
Inc., an air taxi operator 6 entered into a suspension/substitution arrangement with Frontier Airlines in 1970, whereby Air Midwest agreed to provide service to three cities7 which Frontier is obligated to serve under its
certificate in return for which Frontier would suspend service to the same
points. 8 The arrangement requires, inter alia, that Frontier re-institute
service to those cities if Air Midwest could not adequately provide or
ceased to provide the service. Even though Air Midwest uses smaller aircraft and had lower operating expenses than did Frontier in serving those
points, Air Midwest also found the service unprofitable and applied to the
Board for a subsidy in 1973. 9 The Board approved the subsidy sought, but
determined that the subsidy should be paid initially to Frontier which
would be passed to Air Midwest since section 406(a) of the-Act provides
for payment of subsidy to certificated carriers only. 10 The Court held that
section 406(a) gives the Board power to award subsidy to certificated air
carriers only and cannot authorize public moneys to be paid to an uncertificated air carrier. The Court also held that the Board is required to
consider the "need" of the certificated carrier prior to awarding subsidy.
See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74 (1954). The Board
must consider the current needs of the carrier considered as a whole and
"not the needs of any other entity or of any sub-unit of the carrier."
Furthermore, in citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 385 F.2d 648
(1967), the Court stated that "the Focus of 406 need, as already noted,
is to supply the year by year cash requirements for out-of-pocket expense."
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In light of the legislative mandate, as well as the precedent cited
above, the Court found that the Board failed to consider the financial condition of the certificated carrier but considered only the operating experience of the air taxi operator, Air Midwest, in awarding the subsidy and
that furthermore the Board may subsidize a certificated air carrier only.
SEIZURE OF PHILLIPINE AIR LINES DC-10
Part 213 (14 CFR 213) of the Civil Aeronautics Board's Economic
Regulations provides that the Civil Aeronautics Board (Board) may require a foreign air carrier, which is not the subject of an air transportation agreement between the United States government and the government
of the foreign air carrier, to file its existing and proposed schedules of
operations between points in the United States and any point outside the
United States, with the Board. Such schedules must set forth data concerning arrival and departure times, frequency of flights and equipment to be
utilized. Subject to Presidential disapproval, the Board may, in the public
interest, disallow the inauguration of proposed schedules.
Historically, Part 213 was proposed to provide the United States with
leverage in dealing with nations which chose not to enter into reciprocal
treaties concerning air transportation. Hearings on the proposed regulation were held in 1961, and the examiner's initial decision recommended
against adoption of Part 213. The Board chose not to adopt the examiner's
decision and adopted Part 213 in April 1970. The regulation was then
sent to the President (pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §1461) and was approved on
June 3, 1970, with the direction that it go into effect immediately. Thus,
the adoption of Part 213 resulted in amending foreign air carrier permits
of those airlines whose governments did not have reciprocal air transport
agreements with the United States by adding the requirement that they
must file schedules with the Board which would be subject to Board approval.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL) was made a party to the proceedings involving the proposed adoption of Part 213 in January of 1962, by
virtue of its operations pursuant to a foreign air carrier permit.
On July 27, 1973, the Board implemented Part 213 by ordering PAL
to file a schedule (Order 73-7-138). PAL complied with the Board order
without appeal.
On April 4, 1974, PAL again filed proposed schedules indicating that
PAL intended to substitute a DC-10 aircraft instead of the smaller DC-8
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aircraft on its Manila-Honolulu-San Francisco route. On July 12, 1974,
the Board, by Order 74-7-51, rejected the proposed DC-10 schedule. Such
order was transmitted to the President and was approved.
Following the order of July 12th, PAL's Washington counsel represented to the Board on July 16, 1974, that an agreement between the
United States and the Philippines on the reciprocal use of airspace had
been reached. Thus, the Board approved the use of a DC-10 for a single
flight on July 17, 1974. Two additional individual DC-10 flights shortly
thereafter were approved due to the apparent imminence of an agreement between the United States and the Philippines.
On July 23, 1974, the Board received word that a PAL DC-10 was
enroute to Honolulu. No Board representation of approval of the flight had
been given to PAL. In addition, the Board had informed PAL that such
daily individual approval could not continue. Notice was given to PAL
that the Board had authorized the Bureau of Enforcement to take any
necessary enforcement actions including seizure of the aircraft if it attempted landing at San Francisco International Airport. However, PAL
was informed that no action would be taken if the aircraft returned to
Manila after landing in Honolulu. Notwithstanding the Board's warnings,
the PAL DC-10 proceeded to San Francisco where it was seized on July
24, 1975, to secure possible civil penalties in the amount of $267,000,
arising from the alleged violation of the Federal Aviation Act.
In the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the United States contended that the July 24, 1975 flight was unauthorized and accordingly the aircraft was seized to secure any civil
penalties which might arise from the violations." Defendant, PAL, maintained that the seizure was unlawful and that Part 213 was invalid because, inter alia, the Board did not treat foreign airlines on an individual
basis and that the Board could not amend a permit by administrative rule.
The court found that Part 213 was a valid amendment to PAL's permit since its permit was subject "to such reasonable terms, conditions and
limitations required by the public interest as may be from time to time
prescribed by the Board." It was pursuant to this limitation that Part 213
was adopted and PAL was included in the original hearings, with the opportunity to present evidence. The regulation amending PAL's permit was
submitted and approved by the President and thus, the court found the
amendment was well within the Board's statutory powers.
Regarding defendant's argument contesting the actual validity of
Part 213, the court declined jurisdiction. Citing Chicago & Southern Air
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Lines v. Waterman, 333 U.S. 103 (1948) the court held that the regulation "deals with subject matter exclusively of an international character
and thus falls squarely within that area of Presidential authority considered to be sacrosanct."
PAL further contended that the United States lacked the statutory
and constitutional authority to seize the aircraft.
The United States predicated its seizure of the aircraft upon 49 U.S.C.
section 1473(b) (2) which provides that "any aircraft subject to a lien
[as provided for violation of 49 U.S.C. section 1471] may be summarily
seized... ." In 14 CFR 302.808, the Board promulgated procedures to implement the seizure provision and such procedures were accordingly followed on July 24, 1974.
Defendants' argument, contesting the United States statutory authority, centered upon whether the lien referred to in section 1473(b) (2) had
to be an actual lien upon the aircraft in order to effect proper seizure
and not merely a potential lien. The Court found that where plaintiff had
constitutional authority to effect the seizure coupled with probable cause
that the aircraft was in violation of the Federal Aviation Act, that "the
United States must possess the potential to seize offending aircraft if the
Act is to be effective."
In its second seizure argument, PAL challenged the constitutionality
of the seizure. Defendant relied upon the elements set forth in Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) and Sniadich v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969). In light of the elements which must be satisfied before
a pre-judicial seizure can be effective, the Court found this seizure to be
constitutionally sound and stated:
That the seizure of this particular aircraft was necessary to preserve an important right cannot be gainsaid; ...the President
considered Part 213 an important tool in furthering United States
foreign policy in the field of air transportation. It was considered essential that this government be able to maintain control
over its policy regulating foreign air carriers operating within
the United States. The necessity for prompt action,... is equally
obvious; effective implementation of governmental policy required immediate action-especially in the case where an offending aircraft could easily have left the jurisdiction of the United
States. Finally, the Court is satisfied that the statute is sufficiently narrow to provide control over the government's authority in
this area to prevent possible abuse.
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The amount of civil penalties arising from PAL's unauthorized use of
United States airspace is yet to be determined.
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS CASE SETTLED
On March 12, 1975, the Bureau of Enforcement of the Civil Aeronautics Board filed charges in CAB Docket 26363 against American Airlines, Inc. (American) and certain individual respondents, based in part
upon the January 30, 1974 complaint of the Aviation Consumer Action
Project.1 2 American was charged with, inter alia, the disbursement of corporate funds for political contributions and for failing to properly report
such disbursements to the Board. The complaint prayed that American, its
officers, agents, successors and assigns, the individually-named respondents, and persons acting in knowing concert therewith, be ordered to cease
and desist from violating section 407 of the Federal Aviation Act (Act)
and Part 241 of the Board's Economic Regulations, and from engaging
in unfair and deceptive practices within the meaning of section 411 of the
Act.1 3 Specifically, the complaint requested American to cease and desist
from:
1. Maintaining any fund, cash, receivable or other asset of
American not set forth in American's books of account;
2.

receiving any revenue, or causing any disbursement of an
asset, of American not fully and accurately set forth in
American's books of account;

3.

submitting to the Board any report, form or schedule required under Part 241 of the Regulations or otherwise, which
falsely, inaccurately, deceptively, or incompletely represents
any financial transaction or the financial condition of American.

In addition, certain remedial prayers were included in the complaint.
On May 27, 1975, in an Order to Cease and Desist, the Board approved a penalty settlement of $150,000 (Order 75-5-102). Although
American maintained and disbursed without proper disclosure to the Board
for a nine-and-a-half-year period, approximately $275,000 in corporate
funds for political contributions and such amount would most closely approximate the injury to the public as a result of such activities, the Board
agreed with the Bureau of Enforcement and determined not to impose a
$275,000 penalty based upon American's voluntary disclosure of the illegal
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payments, its full cooperation during the investigation, and the repayment
by certain American officials of $125,000 to the corporation from their
personal resources. The order provides that neither the penalty amounts
nor related legal and accounting expenses can be included in the cost accounts upon which American's fares are based. This accounting procedure
will insure that the illegal expenditures will not be passed on to air travelers.
AIRCRAFT WAKES
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has
recently combined research efforts with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in an attempt to find some way aircraft can be modified to
reduce the intensity of aircraft wakes (trailing vortices) or to make the
aircraft wakes (vortices) break down faster.
An aircraft wake is produced primarily by the lifting wings of a
plane. The wings create vortices of swirling turbulent air-like small horizontal cyclones that trail behind the aircraft from the wingtips. The larger
the aircraft, the stronger the wake and such wakes can cause a small aircraft, landing soon after a jumbo-jet to roll completely out of control.
Concern over aircraft wakes was commenced in the early 1950's with
the introduction of the DC-6. The problem has since been amplified by
today's jets that may weigh up to seven times more than the DC-6.
NASA is working with the Department of Transportation to investigate the problem. Ground simulations and in-flight tests at safe altitudes
are being pursued at three NASA centers: Ames and Flight Research
Centers, both in California, and Langley Research Center in Virginia. For
instance, a specially-equipped Lear Jet and a T-37 jet trainer are flown
through wakes created by larger aircraft and precise measurements of the
aircraft upset are made. In this way, aeronautical engineers and scientists
are gaining a better understanding of the mini-cyclones by measuring
their speed. In addition, the FAA is working on avoidance schemes using
instruments which would allow ground controllers and pilots to "see" a
wake so that subsequently landing aircraft could veer away from hazardous zones.14
NASA's goal is to render vortices harmless at a distance compatible
with other safety considerations, about two miles. If a two-mile spacing
system could be instituted, airport towers could land and take off jets at

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

a greater rate. This spacing ability could save jet fuel that is presently
wasted when jetcraft are subjected to holding patterns and wait to taxi
to a runaway.
Early results in the investigative research program indicate that
there are several aerodynamic schemes which can alleviate the wake vortex
upset problem. Such schemes include tailoring of lift across wings, engine
placement, wing spoilers and drag devices. Further research efforts will
be announced in the next few months.
U.S. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Firearmson Aircraft
Effective June 20, 1975, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
imposed tighter regulations governing the carrying of firearms on aircraft by law enforcement officers or other authorized persons. In addition,
the FAA has developed restrictions on the transportation by air of prisoners in the custody of law enforcement officers and transportation of weapons in checked baggage.
In summary, the new regulations specify that:
(1)

Only officials or employees of the U.S., a state or political
subdivision of a state, a municipality or persons authorized
to do so by the air carrier involved and the Administrator
of the FAA may carry firearms on their persons on large
airplanes.

(2)

The air carrier be given at least one hour's notice that a
prisoner is to be escorted on one of its aircraft and that
a weapon will be carried aboard.

(3)

No more than one dangerous prisoner can be escorted on
any one flight and that adequate devices be available to
restrain the prisoner if necessary.

(4)

Liquor not be served to a prisoner, any of his escorts, or
any other person authorized to carry a weapon.

(5)

Weapons cannot be transported in checked baggage unless
they are unloaded, the baggage is locked, the carrier is
notified in advance that it contains a weapon and the bag.
gage is carried in an area that is inaccessible to passengers.
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Before a law enforcement officer or other authorized person can
carry a weapon aboard an aircraft, he must show a defined need in connection with the performance of his duty to have a weapon accessible to
him during the course of the flight. The carrier must be notified at least
one hour in advance of the flight on which the weapon is to be carried.
In an emergency, the carrier should be informed "as soon as practicable."
Dangerous prisoners must be in the custody of at least two escorts
and must be boarded on the aircraft in advance of other passengers and
deplaned subsequent to other passengers. Dangerous prisoners are to be
seated in the rear most seat that is not a lounge or exit. 'Carriers must
be notified in advance of such prisoners' air carriage and advised of their
dangerous nature by the governmental entity involved.
The new regulations were adopted as amendments to Part 121 of the
Federal Air Regulations and apply to all operations of large passenger
aircraft including those used by air travel clubs and air taxi operators.
Jumbo-lets Modifications
On July 11, 1975, the FAA ordered major design changes for all
U.S. wide-bodied aircraft (jumbo-jets) to improve their ability to withstand the type of damage which led to the crash of a McDonnell Douglas
DC-10 outside Paris in May, 1974. The modifications prescribed involve
expansion of relief-vent systems and strengthening of floors, and apply to
Boeing's 747, Lockheed's L-10-11, as well as the DC-10. Deadline for
compliance is December 31, 1977 at an estimated cost of approximately
$40 million to which must be added the revenues lost while the planes
are out of service for modification.
The FAA order does not apply to jumbo-jets flown by foreign airlines although it is expected that some of these will voluntarily follow the
lead of U.S. airlines.
ForeignAirlines Security Program
Also on July 11, 1975 the FAA ordered foreign airlines operating
in the United States, to institute security programs at U.S. gateways similar
to the antihijacking and antisabotage programs required of U.S. airlines
since early 1974. In part, the order requires that the security programs
"be designed to prevent or deter unauthorized access to aircraft and prevent cargo or checked baggage from being loaded" except in compliance
with accepted procedures. The order provides sanctions up to $1,000 per
violation, as is the case with domestic airlines.

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

The FAA order came as no surprise to foreign airlines, many of
which had already instituted safeguards to minimize the dangers of hijacking and sabotage while in U.S. territory.
USE OF SDR
A decision in principle to adopt the International Monetary Fund's
SDR unit of currency as the central basic reference value for negotiating
and establishing worldwide passenger fares, cargo rates, and associated
financial transactions has been agreed to unanimously by International Air
Transport Association (IATA) airline delegates to a special composite
traffic conference which met in Nice, April 29-May 5, 1975. Subject to
approval by the governments concerned and completion of the necessary
additional technical work and agreements, the traditional U.S. dollar and
pound sterling bases used for this purpose since the early 1940s will be
translated into the SDR basing system by April 1, 1977.
Traditionally, all international passenger fares and cargo rates have
been negotiated and agreed by IATA traffic conferences for submission
to governments in two basic currencies, the U.S. dollar and the pound
sterling. Devaluation and floating of these basic and other currencies since
1971 has led to a complicated system of surcharges and discount factors
applied to currencies that have decreased or increased in market value.
No single currency base offers the possibility of matching the continuing wide range of currency fluctuations affecting international marketing transactions, and greater stability can be obtained by using the
SDR basket of currencies system. In deciding to move to the SDR base,
the IATA airlines are recognizing and following current government practices and actions to establish a more stable basis for settling international
business and currency matters.
NOTES
]The latter is a current Board proposal.
2

Proposed by the Board in 1972 and 1973, but no legislative action was taken.

3See, e.g., Rule 40(B), CAB No. 142 Local and Joint Passenger Rules Tariff No.
PR-6, Airline Tariff Publishers, Inc., Agent.
4
Petition of Aviation Consumer Action Project for Issuance of Reasonable Rules
Concerning Printing and Disseminating Information on Air Fares, CAB Docket 27769.

AVIATION
5

See, Pan American World Airways, Inc. and Quantas Airways Ltd., Capacity
Reduction, Order 75-7-27 (July 3, 1975); wherein the Board sets forth factors distinguishing international capacity limitations from domestic capacity agreements.
6

The Board has established a classification for an air carrier known as an air
taxi operator. The air taxi operator is not required to obtain a certificate of public
convenience and necessity under Sec. 401 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, but is
provided with certain exemption authority to engage in air transportation as set forth
in 14 CFR Subpart A of the Board's Economic Regulations. The classification is
established in 14 CFR Para. 298.3.
7

Hutchinson, Great Bend and Dodge City, Kansas.

8See ALPA v. CAB, 494 F.2d 1118 (C.A.D.C. 1964) for discussion by the same
Court approving such arrangements.
9
Air Midwest estimated it would require a subsidy of $131,891 in the following
year to break even on the service while Frontier would require a subsidy of $406,000
if it would be required to resume service at the three cities.
0
t Sec. 406(a) reads: "The Board is empowered and directed, upon its own initiative or upon petition of the Postmaster General or an air carrier, (1) to fix and
determine from time to time, after notice and hearing, the fair and reasonable rates
of compensation for the transportation of mail connected therewith (including transportation of mail by an air carrier by other means than aircraft whenever such transportation is incidental to the transportation of mail by aircraft or is made necessary
by conditions of emergency arising from aircraft operation), by each holder of a
certificate authorizing the transportation of mail by aircraft, and to make such rates
effective from such date as it shall determine to be proper; (2) to prescribe the
methods, by aircraft-mile, pound-mile, weight, space, or any combination thereof, or
otherwise, for ascertaining such rates of compensation for each carrier or class of
air carriers; and (3) to publish the same."
lUnited States v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., D.C.N.O. Calif. No. C-74-1848-OJC,

June 4, 1975.
12 The individual respondents were George A. Spater, Chairman of the Board of
American, Donald Loyd Jones, Executive Vice President of American, R. M. Bressler,
Senior Vice President of Finance (until April 1973) of American, Cyrus S. Collins,
Vice President, Public Affairs of American, J. P. Bass, Vice President of American,
W. G. Woodward, Vice President of American, Thomas P. Smith, Assistant Treasurer
of American and Douglas Stockdale, Vice President of American and General Manager of American Airlines of Mexico. American Airlines of Mexico, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of American and existing as a separate corporation to satisfy Mexican
law, was also included in the suit.
13 Sec. 407 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
(d) The Board shall prescribe the forms of any and all accounts, records,
and memoranda to be kept by air carriers, including the accounts, records, memoranda of the movement of traffic, as well as of the receipt
and expenditures of money,... Provided, that any air carrier may keep
additional accounts, records or memoranda if they do not impair the
integrity of the accounts, records or memoranda prescribed or approved
by the Board and do not constitute an undue financial burden on such
air carrier.
14In earlier days of commercial jet transport, engine exhausts were sooty and
pilots could actually see the vortices ahead of them as swirling smoke. However, today's environmental clean air standards have removed the smoke from engine exhausts and have thereby increased wake hazards by rendering them invisible.

